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TRACING THE CONCEPT OF "PATENTABLE INVENTION"
EDWARD B. GREGGt
The standard of patentable invention, after a long period
of abstention, has received significant attention in the United
States Supreme Court in recent years. Mr. Gregg presents
the point of view of a practitioner who has had a long and
varied experience in the practice of patent law. Avoiding an
extensive study of secondary sources, he confines his analysis
to reported cases with special emphasis on landmark cases in
the United States Supreme Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
O UR AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM is derived from the
English Statute of Monopolies,' which, we are told, put an end
to "bad monopolies" that encroached upon the public domain, such as
a monopoly of playing cards in Darcy v. Allein, but allowed "good"
monopolies where new inventions or manufactures were devised. As far
as I know, the patent systems of the thirteen original Colonies, to the
extent that patent systems then existed, and patents granted by the
States before Congress gave effect to its constitutional grant of power,
have had no significant effect on the present American system. The first
important step taken by the United States in this area was in 1789 with
the ratification of the United States Constitution, which reads in
pertinent part: "The Congress shall have power . . . to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries. '  Pursuant to this constitutional grant, Congress
enacted the first patent statute, the Patent Act of 1790.'
Before 1836, however, the formalities and procedures required
for the granting of a patent were simple and unsophisticated. There
was no Patent Office, no examination was required, and a patent was
granted if the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the At-
t Member of the California and District of Columbia Bars. B.S., New Mexico
State University, 1933; B.A., Oxford University, 1936; LL.B., University of San
Francisco, 1944.
1. 21 Jac. I ch. 3 (1623-24). The statute is set forth in 1 A. WALKER, PATENTS
18-21 (Deller's ed. 1937).
2. 11 Coke, R84-b; 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
4. Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109; See W. ROBINSON, PATENTS § 48, at 76-80 (1890); 1 A.
WALKER, supra note 1, at 35.
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PATENTABLE INVENTIONS
torney General, or any combination of two of these officials deemed the
invention to be sufficiently useful and important.' In that year, through
statutory authorization, the Patent Office was established as was a
system of patent application examination by that agency.6 The require-
ments for patentability as set forth in that statute are that the subject
matter be an art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter (or an
improvement thereof), that it be new and useful, that it be not known or
used prior to the inventor's discovery thereof, and that it be not in public
use or on sale or described in a printed publication prior to the date
of filing the application for the patent.7
II. THE COMMON LAW OF PATENTABLE INVENTION
During much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a
substantial proportion of non-diversity litigation in the lower federal
courts consisted of patent litigation. To a great degree, the important
principles of patent law, including the criteria for determining what
constitutes a patentable invention, were formulated in these courts dur-
ing that period.8 It is notable that while the earliest patent statutes,
mentioned above, did enumerate certain requirements for a patentable
invention, including novelty, utility, not previously in public use or on
sale, they did not mention, as a condition of patentability, that there
must be something unusual about a patentable invention, something in
addition to the formal requirements. This condition of statutory
reticence continued until the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952.1
The Supreme Court, as well as the other federal courts, however,
had long since adopted the rule that even though an invention meets
all of the formal statutory requirements, it nevertheless is not patentable
unless there is something about it which is not obvious to those skilled
in the art to which the invention pertains. This judge-made rule is at
the basis of the common law of patentable invention.
The first Supreme Court case in the area, and still one of the lead-
ing cases, was Hotchkiss v. Greenwood."0 That case involved a patent
on a doorknob made of clay or porcelain instead of other materials,
such as metal, as had been the custom. The trial judge instructed the
jury, in substance, as follows: If the jury found that all that the plain-
5. W. ROBINSON, supra note 4, at § 49, p. 81 nn.1 & 2.
6. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 375, 5 Stat. 117.
7. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, §§ 6-7, 5 Stat. 117.
8. Among the judges of the lower federal courts who played a significant role
in the early formulation of the principles of patent law were Judge Learned Hand
of the Second Circuit and Judge Taft (later Chief Justice of the United States) of
the Sixth Circuit.
9. 35 U.S.C. (1954) [hereinafter referred to as the Patent Code].
10. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 261 (1850).
FALL 1967]
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tiff did was to substitute one material (clay or porcelain) for another
material (metal) and to connect the knob to the spindle and shank in the
same manner as had been done with metal knobs, and that, "no more
ingenuity or skill [was] required to construct the knob in this way than
that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business,""
then the jury should hold the patent invalid and render its verdict for
the defendant. The jury so found and so held. On writ of error, the
Supreme Court affirmed, utilizing the same grounds as the instruction
summarized above, which the Supreme Court reworded as follows:
[F]or unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method
of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the applica-
tion of it to the clay or porcelain knob than was possessed by an
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an
absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute es-
sential elements of every invention. In other words, the improve-
ment is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the in-
ventor.
12
Inherently, the criterion of "ingenuity and skill" above and beyond
that "possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business"
is a subjective criterion. Who is skilled in a business? Having deter-
mined that, how does one determine whether the invention is or is not
within the ordinary skill of such a person? Any patent lawyer who has
tried, participated in, and closely observed a large number of patent
infringement suits over a substantial period of time before a variety of
judges, including newly-appointed freshmen judges and old hands at
patent litigation, will, I believe, agree with the following appraisal of the
situation. Assuming that the invention meets all of the formal statu-
tory requirements of patentability (novelty, utility, etc.) and that it
is not one which, on its face, has a totally obvious character (e.g., the
clay doorknob of Hotchkiss), and assuming further that the invention
has made a substantial contribution to the business to which it pertains,
a conscientious judge will have grave doubts (and there are always
doubts) and will weigh the arguments pro and con as to whether the
advance made by the invention was or was not something which is
within the ordinary skill of one who is competent in the business.
It will not be surprising to lawyers experienced in other types of liti-
gation that the legal principle of "obviousness," as the rule of Hotchkiss
has come to be known, can be, and usually is, obfuscated by the forensic
skill of patent lawyers who bring their experts into court to testify
11. Id. at 279.
12. Id. at 281.
[VOL. 13 : p. 98
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pro-obviousness on behalf of the defendant and anti-obviousness on be-
half of the plaintiff. In patent litigation, as in other types of litigation,
it is the application of a simple rule that is difficult. For example, the
criteria of the average prudent man in connection with the handling of
trust funds, market value in condemnation cases, and safe and rea-
sonable conduct such as the speed of an automobile under prevailing
circumstances are all easily stated but often difficult to apply. So it is
with the test of "obviousness" as set forth in Hotchkiss.
Another pertinent and interesting fact is that in certain fields of
litigation, notably personal injury litigation, the difficult problem of
applying a legal principle to a factual situation is most often fobbed off
on a jury. In most cases it is twelve laymen who, being instructed as
to the law by the judge, must apply that law to conflicting and often-
times confusing factual situations brought out during the course of a
trial. In patent litigation, however, injunctive relief is presently sought
in nearly all cases under section 283 of the Patent Code,'" and such relief
was nearly always sought in earlier days under predecessor statutes.
A patentee seeking relief in the courts is not precluded from a jury trial
if he is willing to forgo demand for injunctive relief, but the attraction
of injunctive relief has been such that jury trials are the exception.
Added to this is the inertia of the patent trial bar which is so accus-
tomed to trials without a jury that we (and I must include myself)
tend to waive the right to a jury trial, preferring instead the more
familiar route of a court trial.
This preference for court rather than jury trials is not peculiar
to practicing lawyers; it is shared to some degree by the judiciary. 4
The following excerpt from a recent opinion by the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit exemplifies this point:
This record presents a perplexing case of alleged patent in-
fringement. It points up the frustration to be found in the growing
practice of requesting jury trials in patent infringment cases in-
stead of proceeding as in equity. The situation was not improved
by the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the
plaintiff's proof. The District Judge was of the view that the
cause of action was altogether without merit and granted the
motion. The plaintiff has appealed. Upon a tedious, painstaking
13. "The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any
right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable." 35 U.S.C.
§ 283 (1954).
14. Parenthetically, it might be an interesting exercise in "comparative" law
(i.e., comparative of judges versus juries in applying legal principles to factual
situations) to study and report upon the statistics of court judgments versus jury
verdicts in patent cases and upon the prevalence of directed verdicts and judgments
n.o.v. in patent jury cases.
FALL 1967]
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review we find it necessary to reverse and remand for a new
trial. 5
In other words, the courts would have been bored only once had the
plaintiff taken the conservative course of a trial in an equity court.
But, having had the audacity to demand his constitutional right to
a jury trial,'" the plaintiff has plagued the courts with two rounds of
perplexing ennui.'1
To return from this digression, the courts have, over the years,
evolved certain more or less objective subcriteria to aid in applying
the basic criterion of nonobviousness to a person skilled in the art.
One such subcriterion is commercial success. That is, has the invention
been a success in the sense that it has to some extent replaced old
structures or modes of operation and has it also been financially profit-
able? If the answer is affirmative, that favors patentability. However,
commercial success may be due to various factors unrelated to the
merits of the invention, such as large advertising expenditures, business
or administrative skill, or a change in technology that has made the in-
vention more practical than before. For example, in the case of plastic
goods, the widespread availability of plastics has made such a contri-
bution to their success that the first person to make a frying pan out
of plastic may have had nothing more than the business acumen to
avail himself of a heat-resistant plastic that was invented and developed
by someone else. A noteworthy case in point is Hotchkiss, wherein
the Court said in substance that the mere exercise of business acumen
in selecting a better material, the qualities of which are already known,
to construct an old device is not sufficient for a patentable invention;
it is only the exercise of the ordinary, expected skill of the art. It is for
such reasons that commercial success has been largely relegated to the
status of a makeweight to be used in support of patentability if, but
only if, without considering it, the issue is otherwise in doubt.'8
This approach may seem to be a semantic trick because, if the issue
of patentability is not in doubt, then the criterion of commercial suc-
cess is superfluous. But what the courts mean is that one or more
of the other subcriteria must be satisfied in order to escape a holding
of invalidity, regardless of the question of commercial success. But,
15. Reynolds-Southwestern Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 372 F.2d 592, 593 (5th
Cir. 1967).
16. U.S. CoNs'r. amend. VII.
17. There is a widespread belief in the patent bar, one which has some justifica-
tion, that certain judges pursue the easy course by construing every doubt about
patentability in favor of nonpatentability and a holding of patent invalidity. But it
has been my experience, and I believe the experience of most other patent lawyers,
that most judges are more conscientious and wrestle with the problem of patentability.
18. For an extensive treatment of commercial success as a makeweight in favor
of patentability see 2 A. WAL"R, PA1UNTS § 125, at 307-28 (Deller's 2d ed. 1964).
[VOL. 13 : p. 98
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if after applying other subcriteria there is still doubt, then the criterion
of commercial success may be considered to resolve the doubt in favor
of patentability.
Another subcriterion, and the one that seems the most persuasive,
is as follows: (1) Was there a problem to be solved? (2) Was this
problem recognized as a problem by others skilled in the art who were,
however, unable to solve it? (3) Did the patented invention solve the
problem? If the answers to questions (1), (2) and (3) are affirmative,
then the patent is valid. If, on the other hand, the answer to any of
these questions is negative, then the patent is more likely than not to
be held invalid.
In Washburn & MoenMfg. Co. v. Beat'Em All Barbed-Wire Co.,'"
generally known as The Barbed Wire Patent, the patent was for a small
improvement in the design of barbed wire, but one which, in the words
of the Court, represented "the final step which has turned failure
[referring to failures of prior patented designs for barbed wire] into a
success."' A more recent case which is more in tune with the modern
trend of severity toward patents is Altoona Publix Theatres Inc. v.
American Tri-Ergon Corp." Altoona involved a patent on sound film
and more particularly a massive flywheel for obtaining a sound track of
high fidelity. The lower court attributed the rapid development of the
sound motion picture industry to the invention of the patent in suit
and for that reason held the patent valid. The Supreme Court disagreed.
After discussing, at length, the ever-present penumbra or overlap of
commercial success (a makeweight) and satisfaction of a longfelt
need (a weighty propatent factor),22 and noting the aforementioned
holding of the lower court, the Court held that "the record fails to
show that there was any longfelt or generally recognized want"2 for
the invention, and that, on the contrary, the success of the invention
was in the nature of a windfall resulting from the development of other
needed equipment such as adequate amplifiers, loudspeakers, and micro-
phones, without which sound pictures were impractical.24 The ultimate
holding of the Supreme Court was that "[o]nly the skill of the art
was required to adapt the flywheel device" to an otherwise fully de-
veloped system.2 5
19. 143 U.S. 275 (1892).
20. Id. at 283.
21. 294 U.S. 477 (1935).
22. Id. at 487-88.
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III. EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON LAW OF PATENTABLE INVENTION
FROM 1930 TO THE EARLY 1950's
The severe economic depression of the 1930's and the New Deal
reforms and attitudes that it precipitated were not without effect on
the patent system. The reforming ardour of such persons as Thurmond
Arnold in the field of "trustbusting" and Walton Hamilton of the
Temporary National Economic Committee 26 created a ground swell
against patents among persons who were influential in Congress, the
executive agencies, and the courts. In 1938 TNEC investigated the
glass manufacturing industry and brought to light certain startling
facts. Hartford-Empire, Owens-Illinois, Corning Glass Works, Hazel-
Atlas, and other companies in the glass manufacturing industry had
pooled their patents and acquired others on glass manufacturing
machinery. This pool and the agreements concerning it dominated
the glass container industry. This situation, described by the Supreme
Court in the ensuing antitrust case as a conspiracy,27 allotted production
quotas among the various manufacturers and severely restrained com-
petition. The muscle and teeth of the conspiracy were the pooled patents.
Any party to, or victim of, the conspiracy who might kick over the
traces was subject to suit and oftentimes was sued for patent infringe-
ment. The portfolio of pooled patents to choose from was immense;
it exceeded 800 in 1938.8
The inequity and iniquity of the Hartford conspiracy had an
unfavorable influence upon the attitudes of high government officials
toward patents in general and toward the standard required for the
granting of a patent. After all, patents were at the heart of the con-
spiracy. In Special Equip. Co. v. Coe,29 the greatest trustbuster of
them all, Mr. Thurmond Arnold, sitting then as a judge of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, denied a patent, not on the
technical grounds urged by the defendant,"° but on a broader ground
of public policy. Under the facts of this case a patent had already
been granted to the plaintiff on its entire machine. Plaintiff sought to
obtain another patent on a part of the same machine. The Commis-
sioner of Patents had denied such a patent, known as a sub-combination
patent, on a technical ground that need not concern us here. Judge
Arnold, speaking for an unanimous court, swept aside this technical
26. Hereinafter referred to as TNEC.
27. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 399 (1945).
28. Id. at 400.
29. 144 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
30. Being an appeal from the Patent Office, the defendant was the Commissioner
of Patents, Conway P. Coe.
[VOL. 13 : p. 98
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ground and affirmed the denial of a patent on the general ground that,
since the plaintiff already had a patent on the entire machine, the only
purpose to be served by a second patent on a part of the machine
(which part was not useful by itself) would be to bar others from using
the sub-combination in conjunction with something else. Judge Arnold
reasoned that "blocking" patents are not in the public interest and do
not serve the constitutional purpose of promoting science and the useful
arts."' Judge Arnold was reversed by a majority of the Supreme Court
in Special Equip. Co. v. Coe,32 but not without a vigorous dissent by
three Justices. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion, concurred in by
Justices Black and Murphy, echoed the thunder of TNEC : "It is a
mistake therefore to conceive of a patent as but another form of private
property. The patent is a privilege 'conditioned by a public purpose.' ""
The 194 0's were indeed dark days for friends of the patent system.
In Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States,3 the Supreme Court,
per Chief Justice Stone, held one of Marconi's wireless patents invalid
for lack of invention. This moved the three dissenting justices to marvel
that in 1943 the Supreme Court, consisting of laymen, in the techno-
logical sense, should hold that a basic contribution to wireless tech-
nology made by Marconi in 1900 was something obvious and unworthy
of a patent.3 6 In Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co.,"7 the Supreme
Court reversed Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit and held a
patent invalid for lack of invention. One of the three dissenting justices,
Mr. Justice Jackson, felt compelled to say:
It would not be difficult to cite many instances of patents
that have been granted, improperly I think, and without adequate
tests of invention by the Patent Office. But I doubt that the remedy
for such Patent Office passion for granting patents is an equally
strong passion in this Court for striking them down so that the
only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been
able to get its hands on. 8
Considerable pessimism was engendered by Supreme Court de-
cisions in the 1940's relating to the standard of patentable invention.
However, this pessimism was relieved somewhat, albeit briefly, when
the Court held a patent valid in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
31. 144 F.2d at 498-99.
32. 324 U.S. 370 (1945).
33. Cf. Justice Douglas' quotation of HAMILTON, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE
152 (TNEC Monograph No. 31, 1941). Id. at 381 (dissenting opinion).
34. 324 U.S. at 382.
35. 320 U.S. 1 (1943).
36. See id. at 63-64 (dissenting opinions).
37. 335 U.S. 560 (1949).
38. Id. at 572 (dissenting opinion).
FALL 1967]
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Prods. Co.,39 which followed close on the heels of Jungersen. It is
worthy of note that Mr. Justice Jackson, the dissenter in Jungersen,
wrote the opinion of the Court in Graver, a unanimous opinion save
only that Justices Black and Douglas stated their conviction that the
ultimate question of patentability is one of law and not of fact. Even
though some of the claims of the patent (those directed to a process of
welding) were held invalid, the victory went to the patentee in Graver
because other claims to the product (a flux used in welding) were held
valid.
Graver is often cited4" for the proposition that Rule 52(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which accords to a trial court's find-
ings of fact a presumption of correctness on appeal, is especially ap-
plicable to a case "where the evidence is largely the testimony of ex-
perts as to which a trial court may be enlightened by scientific demon-
strations,"4 1 and that the Supreme Court, not being a court for cor-
rection of errors, "cannot undertake to review concurrent findings of
fact by two courts below in the absence of a very obvious and excep-
tional showing of error."4 It would be a rash patent lawyer who took
this to mean that appellate courts are more inclined to affirm trial
courts' findings of fact with regard to patentability than other findings.
The only apparent inclination, according to the general consensus of the
patent bar, is that an appellate court is more inclined to reverse when a
district court validates a patent than where the district court finds
invalidity.
The favorable climate engendered by Graver was short-lived. In
1950 the Supreme Court decided Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Corp.43 As in Graver, the patent had been sustained
by both the district court4 4 and the court of appeals.45 However, the
"two court rule" of Graver was not applied in A & P, notwithstanding
the fact that the patented invention had solved a longstanding problem.48
By a unanimous decision the Supreme Court reversed the two lower
courts and held the patent invalid for lack of patentable invention.
Why was respect for the "two court rule" in Graver followed by
a seemingly contradictory result in A & P? The answer, if there is one,
39. 336 U.S. 271 (1949).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 228-29 n.10 (1955) ; Barie
v. Superior Tanning Co., 182 F.2d 724, 727 (7th Cir. 1950); Charles Peckat Mfg.
Co. v. Jacobs, 178 F.2d 794, 802 (7th Cir. 1949).
41. 336 U.S. at 274.
42. Id. at 275.
43. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
44. See Bradley v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 78 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Mich. 1948).
45. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 179 F.2d
636 (6th Cir. 1950).
46. See id. at 638.
[VOL. 13 : p. 98
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is probably to be found in the nature of the inventions in Graver and
A & P. In Graver the invention was a chemical composition which
accomplished a startling result - it was the only welding means where-
by plates as thick as two and one-half inches could be welded in a single
pass, it was far speedier, it produced much better welds than the prior
art, and for the first time welding could be carried out on a large indus-
trial scale without open arcs. In A & P the invention was a simple
mechanical device - a checkout stand for a grocery market consisting
of an open bottom, a three-sided frame or rack, and tracks on the stand
to guide it. The Court could readily see that this contrivance was
simple and that it would operate in an obvious manner, and the crucial
holding of the Court in A & P was as follows:
The conjunction or concert of known elements must con-
tribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the
sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.
Elements may, of course, especially in chemistry or electronics, take
on some new quality or function from being brought into concert,
but this is not a usual result of uniting elements old in mechanics.
This case is wanting in any unusual or surprising consequences
from the unification of the elements here concerned, and there is
nothing to indicate that the lower courts scrutinized the claims in
the light of this rather severe test.47
In A & P the assembly of mechanical parts and the manner in
which they would function were simple and obvious, but in Graver
it was not apparent what the mixture of chemicals would do. The
Graver mixture did some rather surprising things, thereby leading to
an inference of unobviousness. Does "obviousness" as a criterion of
invention mean this: That if a court can readily understand an inven-
tion by inspecting it and can see clearly how it is put together and how
it must operate, then the invention is obvious and unpatentable, but
if the invention mystifies the court, then it is unobvious and patentable?
A simple poem written in English is "obvious" to an English-speaking
reader, whereas a poem written in Sanskrit is not. Does this mean that
the Sanskrit poem is of better quality? The law as it stood prior to
A & P was that the "obviousness" of an invention means obviousness
to one skilled in the art. Perhaps the chemical composition of Graver
may have been obvious to those skilled in the art, but it certainly was
not obvious to technical laymen such as judges, whereas the simple
mechanical combination of A & P might not have been obvious to those
skilled in the art in the sense that they were keenly aware of the problem
but did not have the wit to solve it until the patented invention came
47. 340 U.S. at 152.
FALL 1967]
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along. There were indicia to this effect in A & P, namely a longfelt
need for a better checkout stand and the fact that the solution to this
problem was a long time coming.
IV. THE PATENT ACT OF 1952 - THE PATENT CODE
The patent bar and the lower courts lived and struggled with
A & P for a good many years without further enlightenment from the
Supreme Court. In 1952, not long after A & P, the entire body of
statutory patent law was revised and became the Patent Act of 1952,48
referred to herein as the Patent Code. The Patent Code did more
than tidy up preexisting statutory law in that it codified a number of
important judge-made rules of law. The most important codification
is the following:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner
in which the invention was made.4 9
From 1953 through 1965 there were no Supreme Court decisions
dealing with the standard of patentable invention or interpreting the
above quoted section of the Patent Code. However, some of the lower
courts were of the view that section 103 of the Patent Code had relaxed
the severe standard of A & P."
V. THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
There was great anticipation, and some trepidation, when at last
the Supreme Court, in 1965, granted certiorari in several patent cases
where the standard of invention issue was squarely presented. Certiorari
was granted in Graham v. John Deere Co.5 which was consolidated
with Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co. and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v.
48. 35 U.S.C. (1954).
49. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1954).
50. In Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1960), Judge Learned Hand
stated: "All the constituents may be old, if their new concourse would not 'have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the
art' (§ 103, Title 35) .... We still cannot escape the conclusion . . . that Congress
deliberately meant to restore the old definition, and to raise it from a judicial gloss
to a statutory command." Id. at 503. See also Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
224 F.2d 530, 535 (2d Cir. 1955).
51. Cert. granted, 379 U.S. 956 (1965).
[VOL. 13 : p. 98
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Cook Chem. Co. 5 2 The Graham case involved a patent on a plow and
the Cook cases concerned a single patent on an insecticide dispenser.
At about the same time certiorari was granted in United States v.
Adams"5 which revolved around a patent on an electrical battery.
Like Graver, Adams was a chemical case (in which electrical factors
were also present). Like A & P, Graham and the Cook cases con-
cerned rather simple, albeit not as simple as in A & P, mechanical
inventions.
5 4
The petition of Mr. Abe Fortas, as principal counsel for the peti-
tioner in the Cook cases, posed the question whether the Supreme
Court should end its practice of fourteen years, since A & P, of leaving
to the courts of appeals the final determination of the requisite level of
invention, and should intervene and return the lower courts to the
proper path by requiring a higher level of invention.
Professor Goldstein, in his amicus brief in Graham,5 5 described his
interest, in substance, as follows: The courts, led by the Supreme Court,
have wrought great havoc among patents. For example the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held twenty-two consecutive
patents invalid and the Third Circuit has held thirty-two out of thirty-
three patents invalid with only two dissents. The situation was as
it had been described by Mr. Justice Jackson,5" and it bade well to
accomplish a judicial repeal of the patent system. Professor Goldstein
viewed the patent system as being worth saving, and he beseeched the
Supreme Court to specifically uphold 35 U.S.C. § 103.
The Supreme Court held both the Graham (plow) and Cook
(insecticide dispenser) patents to be invalid for lack of patentable in-
vention.57 In so doing the Court affirmed the court of appeals in
Graham and reversed in the Cook cases. Mr. Justice Clark wrote the
opinion, and there was no dissent. Mr. Justice Stewart did not partici-
pate in the Cook cases. The opinion reviewed the background of the
52. Cert. granted, 380 U.S. 949 (1965).
53. Cert. granted, 380 U.S. 949 (1965).
54. Prestigious counsel were involved in these cases. In the Cook cases, Mr.
Abe Fortas was principal counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Fortas was on the Supreme
Court bench at the time that all of these cases were argued, and of course did not
participate in them. The firm of Arnold (the same Arnold referred to above in con-
nection with Special Equip. Co. v. Coe), Fortas & Porter and the eminent patent law
firm of Watson (formerly Commissioner of Patents), Cole, Grindle & Watson were
of counsel.
55. Professor Goldstein disclaimed any interest in the case, pecuniary or other-
wise, and did not claim any great importance for the patent.
By the time the Graham and Cook cases were argued, amicus curiae briefs
had been filed by Professor E. Ernest Goldstein, Professor of Law at the University
of Texas (Dean Page Keeton being of counsel), the Patent, Trademark and Copy-
right Section of the State Bar of Texas, the American Bar Association, the Illinois
State Bar Association, and the New York Patent Law Association.
56. See p. 105 supra.
57. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 25-26, 37 (1966).
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American patent system and the Patent Code and applied the law sep-
arately to the Graham and Cook cases. The Court held that the Patent
Code codified the case law in force at that time, including the A & P
case and the severe standard of patentable invention in mechanical
cases. The Court harked back to Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,58 and its
requirement of "more ingenuity and skill than that possessed by an
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business."5 Proceeding from
there, the Court reasoned that on the state of the art as shown by the
record, neither the Graham patent (plow) nor the Cook patent (in-
secticide dispenser) displayed anything more than the ordinary in-
genuity or skill of the art, and the patents were accordingly invalid.
It is my opinion that Graham6" leaves the standard of patentable
invention about where it was - high but not impossible. The appli-
cation of the standard now depends, as it always has, upon a court's
conclusion, influenced more or less, or not at all, by subcriteria such
as those previously discussed,6 ' as to whether the novelty of the inven-
tion is something significant and surprising. The quality of being
"surprising" or "obvious" should, under statutory command,6 2 be
determined in the context of those skilled in the art or business; it is
inevitable, however, that the subjective element - surprising or unobvi-
ous to the judge - is an important factor.
It is worthy of note that in A & P, the Court's opinion, per Mr.
Justice Jackson, did not mention the constitutional basis of patents,"
while the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr.
Justice Black, was based upon the Constitution and displayed a rather
severe attitude towards patents.64 No such hostility was indicated in
Graham, nor did Justices Douglas and Black do anything more than
concur in Justice Clark's opinion which was the only opinion in the
case. However, the views expressed by Justices Douglas and Black in
A & P do appear to have prevailed in Graham to the extent that the
Graham opinion was expressly predicated on the Constitution. The
Court explained:
At the outset it must be remembered that the federal patent
power stems from a specific constitutional provision which au-
thorizes the Congress "To promote the Progress of . . . useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive
58. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 261 (1850).
59. 383 U.S. at 11.
60. It has become customary to refer to the Graham decision and the Cook cases
simply as Graham. That custom will be followed in the remainder of this article.
61. See pp. 102-03 supra.
62. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1954).
63. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also p. 98 supra.
64. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147,
154-56 (1950) (concurring opinion).
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Right to their . ..Discoveries." . . . The clause is both a grant
of power and a limitation. This qualified authority, unlike the
power often exercised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
by the English Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in
the "useful arts." It was written against the backdrop of the prac-
tices - eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies - of
the Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or
businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public....
The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not over-
reach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.
Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the
innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby. More-
over, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain,
or to restrict free access to materials already available. Innova-
tion, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful
knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by
constitutional command must "promote the Progress of ... useful
Arts." This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it
may not be ignored. And it is in this light that patent validity
"requires reference to a standard written into the Constitution."
Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress
may, of course, implement the stated purpose of the Framers by se-
lecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the
constitutional aim. This is but a corollary to the grant to Congress
of any Article I power. . . .Within the scope established by the
Constitution, Congress may set out conditions and tests for
patentablity .... It is the duty of the Commissioner of Patents and
of the courts in the administration of the patent system to give
effect to the constitutional standard by appropriate application, in
each case, of the statutory scheme of the Congress.65
Another interesting point of comparison between A & P and
Graham is that in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in A & P
the Patent Office was taken severely to task for the looseness with which
it applied the standard of invention. Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
The attempts through the years to get a broader, looser
conception of patents than the Constitution contemplates have
been persistent. The Patent Office, like most administrative agen-
cies, has looked with favor on the opportunity which the exercise
of discretion affords to expand its own jurisdiction. And so it has
placed a host of gadgets under the armour of patents - gadgets
that obviously have had no place in the constitutional scheme of
advancing scientific knowledge. A few that have reached this Court
show the pressure to extend monopoly to the simplest of
devices .... 66
65. 383 U.S. at 5-6.
66. 340 U.S. at 156 (concurring opinion).
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Thereafter, Justice Douglas' opinion listed twenty alleged examples of
the passion of the Patent Office to grant patents on gadgets, the most
recent being Dunham v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 7 decided in 1894, certainly
not a case of recent vintage even as of 1950 when the A & P case was
decided. The same propensity of the Patent Office to grant patents
rather freely was commented upon, but in a more kindly fashion, in
Graham:
We have observed a notorious difference between the standards
applied by the Patent Office and by the courts. While many
reasons can be adduced to explain the discrepancy, one may well be
the free rein often exercised by Examiners in their use of the con-
cept of "invention." In this connection we note that the Patent
Office is confronted with a most difficult task. Almost 100,000
applications for patents are filed each year. Of these, about 50,000
are granted and the backlog now runs well over 200,000 ...
This is itself a compelling reason for the Commissioner to strictly
adhere to the 1952 Act as interpreted here. This would, we believe,
not only expedite disposition but bring about a closer concurrence
between administrative and judicial precedent.6
It is my observation, based upon long experience in practice before
the Patent Office, that this venerable agency does not apply a uniform
standard of invention. I feel that there is considerable merit to Justice
Clark's observation that the Examiners, of whom there are hundreds,
ranging from freshmen to veterans, have too free a rein in exercising
their judgment as to "invention." In certain classes of cases, such as
chemical cases, it has been my observation that the Patent Office stand-
ard is quite high, but that in some other types of cases the standards
are altogether too low. In what might be called "Simple Simon" fields
of endeavor, the standards are remarkably low. This situation is a dis-
credit to the patent system because each patent is issued by the same
agency, under the same law, with the same seal, and is representative of
the patent system.
Turning now to the Adams69 case, which was decided the same
day as the Graham and Cook cases, the Court held the patent valid.
Adams presents, so to speak, the other side of the figurative coin in
relation to Graham. The plaintiffs in Adams were a group of indi-
viduals, including the inventor, Burt Adams, and others, who pre-
sumably were co-owners of the patent. The defendant was the biggest
of them all, the United States of America. Suit was brought in the
67. 154 U.S. 103 (1894).
68. 383 U.S. at 18-19.
69. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966). Mr. Justice Clark also wrote
the opinion in Adams. Mr. Justice White dissented without an opinion.
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Court of Claims pursuant to section 1498 of the Judicial Code for
infringement of the patent by the United States, and the Court of
Claims held the patent valid.7" The patent was for ai nonrechargeable
battery having a magnesium electrode and a cuprous chloride electrode.
Adams' purpose in developing his invention was to construct a battery
which could be supplied in dry, inactive condition and filled with water
at the time of use to activate it. This simple battery was characterized
by the Supreme Court as "the first practical, water-activated, constant
potential battery which could be fabricated without any fluid in its
cells."' Included in the impressive list of virtues of this battery, as set
forth in the Court's opinion, was the fact that it could be supplied in
dry condition (without fluid), activated in a very short time (30
minutes) by adding water, deliver a large amount of power in relation
to its size, and do so at a constant voltage regardless of variations in
the rate at which current was drawn from the battery. 2
Thus far in the Adams drama the story is much the same as in
most patent suits, only perhaps more so. Rarely is there a patent in-
fringement suit where it cannot be said that the patented device has ad-
vantages, for if there are no advantages, no one would copy and there
would be no law suit. The next chapter in the Adams drama as it un-
folded in the Supreme Court's opinion is that after developing the
battery Adams took it to the United States Army Signal Corps whose
experts would not believe Adams' battery could do what he claimed
for it. But this position changed and the Government used many of
these batteries and attributed important technical developments to their
existence. However, the Government did not give the business to
Adams; the business went to others. 3
The opinion then reviewed the prior patents asserted by the Gov-
ernment to anticipate or to make obvious Adams' invention and con-
cluded that each of them failed to suggest the use of a magnesium
electrode in combination with a cuprous chloride electrode. The opinion
refused to accept the Government's contention that the combination of
a magnesium electrode, a cuprous chloride electrode, and water (to be
added at the time of use) as the electrolyte was not a new innovation;
instead the Supreme Court agreed that this was a novel combination
of features.
70. Adams v. United States, 330 F.2d 622 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
71. 383 U.S. at 43.
72. Id.
73. Surprisingly, the Government did not notify Adams of its changed views nor
of the use to which it was putting his device, despite his repeated requests. In
1955, upon examination of a battery produced for the Government by the Burgess
Company, he first learned of the Government's action. His request for compensa-
tion was denied in 1960, resulting in this suit. Id. at 44.
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On the crucial question - was this combination of elements obvi-
ous or unobvious- the Supreme Court opinion held (1) that there
were technical reasons for supposing that this combinaiton would not
work, because the Adams battery continued to operate even when there
was an open circuit, something which had previously been considered
impractical and (2) water-activated batteries had been successful before
Adams only when used with electrolytes that were incompatible with
magnesium.7 4 The clincher in the opinion is as follows:
Nor are these [the factors discussed above] the only factors
bearing on the question of obviousness. We have seen that at the
time Adams perfected his invention noted experts expressed dis-
belief in it. Several of the same experts subsequently recognized
the significance of the Adams invention, some even patenting im-
provements on the same system.75
VI. CONCLUSION
What conclusion can be drawn from Hotchkiss, Graver, A & P,
Graham, Adams and section 103 of the Patent Code? I would be pru-
dent perhaps, but delinquent in my duty, if I were to evade a conclusion.
Being more foolhardy perhaps than I should, I will essay a conclusion.
At least since Hotchkiss, it has been the law that not every advance
in science or the useful arts is worthy of a patent; some ingenuity, some-
thing more clever than the work of the routineer, is and always has
been required. Give a problem to a man having average skill in some
art or science, the problem being within his area of skill. If that man,
seeing and understanding the problem, can without difficulty see the
probable solution, which he then accomplishes, then there is no patent-
able invention. If, however, the problem defies solution by such men
of skill until some clever fellow comes along with an answer, then there
is a patentable invention. Or if practical solutions are apparent but one
man reaches a better solution in an unorthodox way, there is a patent-
able invention.
This has been the rule at least since Hotchkiss, but the manner
in which the rule has been applied has changed. At the time of
Hotchkiss, and through the early part of the present century, more
weight was given to the factor of commercial success, or the courts
were more inclined to construe a given set of facts as indicating satis-
faction of a long felt need rather than as mere commercial success
or skill of the art. Compare, for example, The Barbed Wire Patent
76
74. Id. at 51-52.
75. Id. at 52.
76. See p. 103 supra.
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decided in 1892, with Altoona77 decided in 1935. In the 1892 case the
finishing touch applied to a succession of improvements was deemed
to amount to something more than the expected skill of the art, but in
the 1935 case the success of the patented invention was attributed by the
Supreme Court (in disagreement with the lower court) to the advent
of related equipment.
It is my belief that the rule of Hotchkiss has always been in force.
This rule has never been disavowed by the Supreme Court nor by any
but an occasional embittered lower court. It was the feeling of many
during the period commencing with the advent of the Patent Code on
January 6, 1953 and ending with the Graham and Adams cases that
section 103 of the Patent Code codified this rule. That view has been
confirmed by Graham and Adams. The change that has occurred - and
there has been a great change - has been a change in emphasis or bias.
The world today is very different from the world of the 1920's and
earlier, as witness the changed attitudes of courts even without bene-
fit of legislation, toward such matters as the requirement of privity
in connection with warranties of merchandise, changed attitudes re-
garding employer-employee and master-servant relationships, racial
segregation, M'Naghton's rule, etc. The severe attitude of the courts
today with respect to patents was born in and of the depression of the
1930's and it is still with us. There is an analogy between the evil and
the good of the patent system and the fate of Caesar according to Mark
Anthony. The most flagrant abuses of the patent system were killed
and buried with the Hartford-Empire case7" - today no lawyer in his
right mind would counsel any businessman to do the things that were
done in the Hartford conspiracy. Yet the evil of that conspiracy lives
on in the memories of many.
79
77. See p. 103 supra.
78. See p. 104 supra.
79. This conclusion would be incomplete without a brief comment on Senate
Bill 1042 and House of Representatives Bill 5924, now pending in the 90th Congress.
The two bills are the product of a Presidential Commission and are sponsored by the
President. They have encountered an uncommon amount of criticism from the patent
bar, largely on highly technical grounds, which comes as no surprise to those who
are aware of the strain of pedantry in that group of engineer-scientist lawyers. But
these bills, whether enacted or not, should have no effect on the burden of this article,
because both bills carry forward present section 103 intact.
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